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Debatable Land: An Essay on theRelationship Between English
and Scottish Criminal Law
Lindsay Farmer*
This article proposes that a better understanding of the identity of Scots criminal
law can be developed through an analysis of the similarities between English and
Scots law rather than by concentrating on the differences. It argues that historically
there are striking similarities between the two laws which have been overlooked or
ignoredfor various reasons. It goes on to argue that many of the current differences
between the two laws can be explained in terms of contemporary academic and
institutional conditions, and that these offer a betterfoundation on which to construct
a principled theoretical understanding of Scots criminal law.
A. INTRODUCTION
The "debatable land" was an area of the Border Marches, the strip of land between
Scotland and England at the time when the border between the two nations was
unsettled. It was a small area to the east and north of Carlisle and Gretna Green,1
although the term could just as well be applied to the whole of the border
country between Carlisle and Dumfries in the west, and Berwick and Alnwick in
the east, for the status and identity of this land was debatable in a number of
different ways. It was not only a matter of the indeterminacy of the border, though
the almost constant raids or reiving and warring had led to the area being put
under the jurisdiction of special wardens. It was also that, in the process of being
fought over, it at times fell outside the jurisdiction of both countries. It was
• Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Birkbeck College, London. He writes: "This paper was first
presented at a staff seminar at Aberdeen University. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar,
and in particular Chris Gane and Scott Styles, for their comments and questions. I am also extremely
grateful to Niki Lacey for her comments and corrections."
1 On the debatable land see J Reed, Border Ballads (1973), ch 1; T I Rae, The Administration of the
Scottish Frontier 1513-1603 (1966). For an example see the ballad "Kinmont Willie":
And as we cross'd the Bateable Land,
When to the English side we held,
The first o' men that we met wi',
Whae sould it be but fause Sakelde?
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literally lawless, the land of broken men and outlaws, laid waste by decree and
by battle,2 where the law could only be made or imposed by physical force. It was
at the same time a psychological space where the different cultures collided, and
each defined itself through its proximity to the other.3 And the terms of the
debate over the physical, legal and cultural identity of this area were those of
violence and poverty, romance and superstition.4 It was border country in the
truest sense of the term, and this borderland, the debatable land, has ever been
central to the Scottish identity, its importance belied by its peripheral position
in the nation.
This essay is a journey through the debatable land of the criminal law, the shared
territory that lies between the English and Scottish laws. I shall make the claim that
up to the post-war period, more or less until the passing of the Homicide Act 1957,
there are a number of striking similarities between the two laws, a claim that I shall
illustrate by means of a few key examples. I will thus argue that there has only been
a major divergence in the substantive law of the two systems over the last forty
years. In so doing I wish to contest the frequently made claim that there is a funda-
mental divergence between the two systems of criminal law, explained in terms of
the Scottish character or the distinctive "genius" of Scots law, and that this in its
turn requires that we rethink the terms in which the identity of Scots law is defined.5
It will thus be argued that any differences, which have become much more marked
over the subsequent period, have little to do with such supposedly fundamental
characteristics and must instead be explained in terms of more contemporary
differences in the legal and academic culture of the two jurisdictions. There are
many articles on the differences between the two systems which reveal a preoccupa-
tion with the importance of this difference as a means of establishing a distinctive
identity—and the potential threat to identity that is contained in the possibility of
identity.6 However, it could be argued that as a result of this there are few studies
2 A proclamation of 1551 by the Wardens of both countries decreed that: "All Englishmen and
Scottishmen
. . .
are and shall be free to rob, burn, spoil, slay, murder and destroy all and every such
person or persons, their bodies, buildings, goods and cattle as do remain or shall inhabit upon any
part of the said Debatable Land, without any redress to be made for the same" (cited in Reed,
Border Ballads, 42).
3 For a fine fictional account of the psychological space of the borders, which not only explores the
world of myths and ballads but also plays with an elastic notion of the physical space, see J Hogg,
The Three Perils ofMan (1822, 1996 reprint).
4 "... singing down the centuries their strange and melancholy tales of love and hate and longing, of
thieving and killing, of jealousy, incest, witchcraft and revenge" (Reed, Border Ballads, 10).
5 This is an exercise that has also been shaped by the personal schizophrenic experience of learning
and teaching and subsequently conducting research into English criminal law.
6 There is a long tradition of such writings beginning with D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of
Scotland Respecting Crimes 4th edn (1844, henceforth Hume, Commentaries), introduction. See,
for example, H Cockburn, "(Untitled) review of Alison's Remarks on Administration of Criminal
Justice in Scotland" (1825) 82 Edinburgh Review 450-464; W Forsyth, "Scotland and England"
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that truly examine the identity of the Scots law, for this is a question that can
perhaps only be properly addressed by proceeding in the manner proposed here.
In concluding, the article will begin to address the question of what a distinctive
Scots criminal law, freed of these essentialist explanations, might look like. This
essay accordingly begins from the simple premise that it may be more instructive
to look for similarities between the two systems, the shared peripheral territory,
as a means of showing how the boundary or border between the two has been
constructed.
It is worth dwelling for a moment on the meaning of borders for this can further
elucidate the nature of the problem. Our understanding of this term has changed
over time, together with our changed understanding of nation and nationality.7 In
the modern nation-state the border is a line to be passed over, a transitional moment
that signifies the periphery, the point at which the journey to the centre commences
or concludes. A border in this sense is purely a political or administrative boundary,
referring to a line of absolute division—where Scotland ends and England begins—
rather than a territorial space. The Scottish Borders itself is now a region that is
passed over or through as the traveller goes from Scotland to England, the turbulent
history signified only by a name designating an administrative area—ironically entirely
within Scotland—and the border reiver lives only as the chosen symbol of a public
relations exercise. In this sense the border is the furthest point from the centre, a
moment of physical and psychological separation, and the space of the Borders is
peripheral to Scottish identity. However, the border was not always the limit of the
jurisdiction of the state. It could be an area, rather than a line, where communities
lived out the drama of defining their own identity. It was a territorial space that was
both permeable and indeterminate, where two cultures, two extremes, met—and
becoming in that process the central or common ground of the debate. Now the
Scottish heartland is sought in the central belt, and the further you move from the
centre the weaker or more diluted it is thought to become; but the Scottish identity
was equally forged on the peripheries, in the debatable land where one country
imperceptibly becomes the other, and the law was made in an area that was lawless.
The borders were the crucible in which the Scottish identity was shaped, not through
the process ofdivision or separation, but through a mingling and conflict of cultures—
this was the point at which the sense of identity needed to be strongest. It is clear,
(1858) 108 Edinburgh Review 343-376; A D Gibb, "The inter-relation of the legal systems of Scotland
and England" (1937) 53 Law Quarterly Review (LQR) 61-79; T B Smith, British Justice. The Scottish
Contribution (1961, henceforth Smith, British Justice).
7 "They are a people that will be Scottishe when they will, and Englishe at their pleasure" (1583),
quoted in Reed, Border Ballads, 10. On borders and nations generally, see B Anderson, Imagined
Communities (1980) chs 1 and 2.
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then, that we should not begin our investigation from the centre, where such
differences are both accentuated and protected, but from this debatable land where
the cultures come together.
B. SHARED TERRITORY
The theme of the argument is that in general terms the English and Scottish criminal
law were close in terminology, substance and structure in the post-war period but
that, beginning approximately with the Homicide Act 1957, there has been a period
of divergence as the English law, in particular, underwent a process of revision and
modernisation. Put in more direct terms, it can be argued that much of the Scots
common law of crime reads as pre-1960s English law. I realise, of course, that this is
an extravagant claim and that for every example of similarity that can be presented
there are no doubt an equal, or possibly greater, number of counter-examples.
Equally, I would acknowledge that it is possible to be distracted from the underlying
differences between systems by the existence ofsuperficial similarities in terminology.
I would, however, ask a little forbearance, for the purpose is neither to claim an
exact equivalence nor to undermine the separate character of Scots law—claims
that might justifiably provoke a defensive reaction on the part of Scots lawyers. The
purpose of this claim is the more limited one of suggesting that in certain key areas
and understandings ofcriminal law and liability, there is little evidence of the existence
of that fundamental divergence between the laws that has been claimed by certain
defenders of a distinctive Scottish legal tradition. I propose to look briefly at four
different areas of the law to build up a picture of a common "Common Law mind".
These are the areas of offences against property, the doctrine of provocation, the
law of homicide, and the declaratory power of the High Court. These have been
chosen either because they have come to be regarded as indicators of a more
fundamental difference between the two systems, or as areas in which divergence in
the period after 1957 has been the greatest.8
(1) Offences against Property
It is appropriate to begin with a discussion of offences against property since it is
often assumed that this is the area in which there are the greatest differences between
English and Scots law. Historically shaped by the extensive use, and avoidance, of
the death penalty, the protection ofprivate and public property has been of a peculiar
8 There are any number of other examples where similar questions and issues could be explored. The
response to mental illness and the reception of the M'Naghten Rules in Scotland or the question of
the defence of intoxication are two that suggest themselves. It is not the purpose of this article to
undertake such a full-scale survey, however valuable that might be.
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symbolic importance to the English legal mind.9 The English law, moreover, is
largely statutory and has been since at least 1861 when the existing statutory law
was consolidated into a single statute.10 However, if the forces that formed the laws,
and the uses which were made of the law, in the two jurisdictions were not the
same, it is none the less striking that prior to the recent codification of the English
law in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978 there
were broad similarities in the terminology and definition ofproperty offences—and
in the absence of principle underlying the development of both. Ifwe take the law
of theft, for example, we find that the basic definition of the crime is composed of
the same three elements: the taking lucri causa, defined in terms of movement
(amotio or asportatio), and the intention permanently to deprive the owner thereof
(animusfurandi)—a term frequently translated as "felonious taking" although strictly
speaking this has no meaning under Scots law.11 Such similarities should not surprise
us since the law in both jurisdictions was drawn from Roman sources,12 and the
English consolidations of the law in the mid-nineteenth century, unlike more recent
statutes, sought to preserve the form of the Common Law by purging it of the
legislative excesses of the previous century.13 There are clearly also differences—
the most obvious being the use of the term larceny in England—but these are largely
questions of terminology alone and do not affect the underlying structure of the
law.
Some of the most interesting resemblances occur in the way that the definitions
of particular crimes are structured, for these point not only to a common origin, but
to similar patterns of development. For example, although burglary is a separate
nominate crime under English law, rather than being regarded as an aggravation of
9 See, for example, the now classic treatment of eighteenth-century property offences in D Hay,
"Property, authority and the criminal law" in D Hay et al (eds), Albion's Fatal Tree (1975), 17-63.
See more generally J Hall, Theft, Law and Society 2nd edn (1952, henceforth Hall, Theft, Law and
Society) bk 1, and G Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978, henceforth Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law) chs 1-3 on the development of the common law of theft.
10 24 & 25 Viet c 96 (1861). Cf Hall, Theft, Law and Society, 34: "practically the entire modern law of
theft has been a product of the eighteenth century". On eighteenth-century Scottish attitudes towards
legislation, see L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order. Crime and the Genius ofScots
Law 1747 to the Present (1997, henceforth Farmer, Criminal Law), ch 2.
11 See e.g. J H A Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland 5th edn (1948,
henceforth Macdonald, Practical Treatise), 16: "Theft is the felonious taking and appropriation of
property
. .
.". In England theft was defined under the Larceny Act 1916, s 1(1), as where a person




takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen, with
intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof".
12 See e.g. Hume, Commentaries, i, 57. Cf W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland 1st
edn (1765-69, 1979 reprint), iv, ch 17 and J F Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law ofEngland(1883) ch 28.
13 The Acts of 1861 were consolidations only of the statutory and not the common law of crime. On
this point see C S Greaves, The Criminal Law Consolidation and Amendment Acts of24 h 25 Viet
2nd edn (1861), introduction.
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a basic offence of theft, the two jurisdictions share a common approach in the way
that aggravation/crime is defined in terms of the buildings that might be broken
into, or in the distinction drawn in the courts between actual and constructive
breaking.14 This is also true of crimes ofdamage to property where prior to the 1971
Act in England the definitions were of the same type. In both jurisdictions the
modern crime had taken shape through the amalgamation of some serious public
order offences and other more minor mischiefs or trespasses against property,
together with various statutes either protecbng specific types ofproperty (e.g. railways,
industrial machinery) or protecbng against certain types of damage (e.g. causing
damage by explosions). This haphazard accretion of offences had over time produced
a certain amount of conceptual inconsistency, which the 1971 Act was intended to
remedy in England.15 In spite of the fact that the bulk of the English law was contained
in the Act 24 & 25 Victoria c 97, the division of the crime into different degrees
according to the type ofproperty destroyed and the "malice" of the offender reflected
origins in the common law of both countries.16 Both jurisdictions had historically
distinguished the more serious crime of deliberately setting fire to a dwelling house
as a separate nominate offence (fire-raising and arson respectively), although by the
post-war period the definition of a house had become sufficiently elastic as to
encompass almost all structures and thus render the crime practically indistinguishable
from other types of malicious destruction of or damage to property. These other
offences were treated as various forms of malicious mischief, where the degree of
malice had gradually become the decisive factor in defining the seriousness of the
offence.17
This points to a further level at which common ground can be recognised, namely
the way that the courts paralleled each other in recognising and dealing with certain
problem cases, a point that can be best illustrated by examining the historical
development of the law of theft.18 In both jurisdictions the traditional definition of
theft gave rise to a common problem: theft had been defined as requiring the felonious
14 Cf the crime of reset or receiving stolen property. In English law this was criminalised through the
process of extending the notion of the resetter being an accessory after the fact—something that
would not have been possible under Scots law. See G H Gordon, Criminal Law 2nd edn (1978,
henceforth Gordon, Criminal Law), para 5-57. On the development of English law see Hall, Theft,
Law and Society, 52-58.
15 On this see Malicious Damage (Law Com No 29, 1970).
16 To leave aside the questions ofwhether this was an instance of Scots borrowing from the English or
vice versa.
17 As opposed to the means of destruction or the circumstances surrounding the crime. See for England,
C S Kenny, Outlines ofCriminal Law 15th edn (1936, henceforth Kenny, Outlines), ch XI, and for
Scotland, Macdonald, Practical Treatise, 79-86.
18 That is, the situations that were recognised as hard cases in the two jurisdictions. On problematisation
and incremental growth of the English common law particularly in relation to the subject-matter of
theft see Hall, Theft, Law and Society, ch 3. He also points out that English legislation of the
eighteenth century did not seek to alter the structure of the common law.
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taking of property, but in certain increasingly common cases it was not clear that
there had been an actual taking from the possession of another, the theftuous intent
apparently only being formed at some point after the possession of the property had
passed legitimately to the "thief". Hume's discussion of this, for example, sets out a
fairly orthodox eighteenth-century account of the law. This aimed to restrict the
scope of theft within narrow bounds by distinguishing between the crime of theft
and other forms of appropriation of property (fraud, swindling and breach of trust),
which was done on the grounds that it was the responsibility of the owner to ensure
the trustworthiness of those to whom they entrusted goods. He none the less also
admitted the possibility of the constructive extension of the concept of possession
so as to protect certain forms of property that were being passed into either the
possession or custody of third parties.19 Though first discussed in English law in
1473 in the famous Carrier's Case,20 the types of situation that gave rise to these
problems became increasingly common in both jurisdictions from the mid-eighteenth-
century onwards, with the expansion of commerce and the increased circulation of
commercial property. The changing interpretation of the law in the period after
Hume also reflects a common response to the decreasing use of capital punishment
for the crime of theft.21 In both jurisdictions the response to the problems was a
judicial reinterpretation of the basic elements of the common law definition. Thus,
theft came to be defined primarily in terms of intent, and the actions of the accused
from the point at which they formed the intent onwards were treated as a constructive
form of taking.22 The physical act became less important in favour of a more diffuse
idea of appropriation, thus breaking the traditional distinction between theft and
breach of trust. It is important to note, however, that these constructive extensions
of the law cannot be said to have taken place on a particularly principled basis.
Indeed, it is not clear that there was in either jurisdiction a single principle (or
principles) around which the law developed. An expanded notion of intent allowed
the scope of the law to be judicially extended in response to changing patterns of
social and commercial organisation,23 but the common factor is above all the reliance
on judicial opportunism. What is perhaps most surprising is the continuing absence
of a clear definition of something as apparently fundamental as the central concept
19 Hume, Commentaries, i, 57-70.
20 YB 13 Edw IV f 9, pi 5. On the Carrier's Case see Hall, Theft, Law and Society, ch 1, and Fletcher,
Rethinking Criminal Law, ch 2.
21 In England the death penalty was abolished for most forms of theft by the early 1830s (7 & 8 Geo IV
c 29; 2 & 3 Wm IV c 62; 3 & 4 Wm IV c 44). In Scotland theft theoretically remained a capital crime
until the passing of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887, s 56, though in practice it had
ceased to be so long before this.
22 For illustration see the Scottish cases ofJohn Smith (1838) 2 Swin 28 and Geo Brown (1839) 2 Swin
394 and the English cases of R v Pear (1779) 168 ER 208 and R v Thurborn (1848) 169 ER 293.
23 Cf Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, ch 3, on the shift between "manifest" and "subjective"
criminality.
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of property.24 This process of a shared stumbling from one problem to the next and
contriving to make a virtue out of expediency is something that terminated only
with the passing of the Theft Act 1968. This set the course ofEnglish law on another
path altogether by attempting to reorder the basis of the law of theft—though sadly
it cannot be reported that it has led to any greater clarity of expression or of judicial
comprehension.
(2) Provocation
The doctrine of provocation, Hume writes, requires a more restrictive application
in Scotland than in England, particularly in relation to the acceptance ofprovocation
by verbal injury alone, due to the more "fervent" character of the Scots.25 Yet a close
examination once again reveals a common pattern in the development of law in the
period up to 1957. One of the key issues, indeed, in this area has been precisely that
of whether words could be admitted as a form of provocation or whether use of the
plea was restricted to provocation by deeds alone. Broadly speaking, prior to 1957
there was judicial resistance in both jurisdictions to the admission of provocation by
words or insulting or disgusting behaviour, even though there were isolated instances
of cases where judges had allowed the question to go to the jury.26 This narrow
approach was justified on the grounds that the provocation had to be brought within
certain accepted categories (principally those of serious assault, assault of a third
party, or adultery). The explanation given for this resistance was that provocation
was regarded as having developed out of the doctrine of killing in self-defence, as a
middle path between the stark alternatives of a finding of guilt with the mandatory
death penalty, or the complete exculpation of the accused. It held in common with
self-defence the requirement that there be some correspondence between the
provocation given and the response as a justification for the recognition of human
frailty.27 The categories, having developed out of theories which justified the killing
in terms of the appropriate response to affronts to masculine honour, had gradually
taken on the character of more fixed legal rules.28 These rules tended to displace the
24 On this point see Hall, Theft, Law and Society, ch 3. I Dennis, "The critical condition of criminal
law" (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 213-249 at 221-223 argues that the 1968 Act seeks to define
theft in terms of the offence against property rather than the trespass on possession, criticising the
inability of the judiciary to appreciate the consequences of this shift in their interpretation of the
Act.
25 Hume, Commentaries, i, 249—on the basis that a greater restraint was therefore the necessary aim
of the law.
26 See the cases discussed in Gordon, Criminal Law, paras 25-26 to 25-29.
27 It was not until the case of Crawford v HM Advocate\950 JC 67 that a strong distinction between
the pleas of self-defence and provocation was drawn in Scots law: cf HM Advocate v Kizileviczius
1938 JC 60. On the early development of the pleas of self-defence and provocation in Scots law see
Farmer, Criminal Law, ch 5.
28 See generally J Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992, henceforth Horder, Provocation),
esp ch 5.
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question of whether the response was justified, to replace it with "a land of legal
presumption that the defendant was in fact carried to revenge by the irresistible
impulse of ungovernable passion".29 It was presumed that there could never be
correspondence between verbal provocation and killing in retaliation. The courts in
both jurisdictions were thus willing to admit verbal provocation only in the extremely
limited circumstance of the disclosure of an adulterous relationship, on the grounds
that this could be regarded as an extension ofone of the existing accepted categories.30
More interestingly, judicial discussion of the question suggests that this position
has been further justified in terms of the respective functions of judge and jury,
with the judge being able to withhold the plea from the jury if it did not fall into one
of the pre-existing categories.31 The question ofcorrespondence between provocation
and retaliation could, at best, operate as a triggering factor—not raising the general
question of whether the response was justified in the circumstances, but allowing
certain actions to be considered as potentially falling within one of the legal categories.
The role of the jury was thus heavily circumscribed by legal considerations. The
importance of this point can be thrown into sharper relief ifwe consider the impact
of the changes introduced into the English law ofprovocation by s 3 of the Homicide
Act 1957. The Act modified the existing common law rather than completely replacing
it, the principal change being made in the rule governing the circumstances under
which provocation could be considered by the jury. The plea was extended to all
cases of homicide where there was some factual evidence of the existence of
provocation.32 This represented an important shift in the balance between law and
fact in the courtroom, and to some extent a diminution of the power of the judge, as
it was established that the existence of provocation as a matter of fact, and hence
the issue of the justifiability of the response, was always to be left to the jury (subject
to certain guidelines). Horder has suggested that recent English case-law on the
characteristics of the "reasonable man" under provocation is better understood as
an attempt to restore judicial control of the doctrine—by reinterpreting the 1957
Act so as to restore certain "objective" legal categories which would prevent the
29 Ibid, 89. Horder even suggests (ibid, 93) that the decline of honour-based theories in English law
was connected in some way to Scottish doctrine.
30 Even this would not always be sufficient to ground the claim. For example, in the leading English
case of DPP v Holmes [1946] AC 588 the House of Lords held that a statement by a wife about her
adultery was not sufficient provocation to justify a verdict of manslaughter. For Scotland see Hume,
Commentaries, i, 245; HM Advocate v Hill 1941 JC 59 and HM Advocate v Delaney 1945 JC 138,
both of which are discussed in Gordon, Criminal Law, at para 25-24.
31 See e.g. Viscount Simon in Holmes (above, n 30).
32 Section 3 of the Act states: Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can
find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or things said or by both together)
to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man
do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury
shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion,
it would have on a reasonable man.
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question of justifiability going to the jury—rather than as a particular application of
the conflict over subjectivism.33 The position in Scotland, meanwhile, has remained
that verbal provocation is normally inadmissible, notwithstanding the existence of a
few recent, and exceptional, cases where at the discretion of the judge evidence of
verbal provocation has been left to the jury.34
This discussion thus reveals that Scots law does, in fact, take a more restrictive
approach to the question of provocation than that taken in English law35—though
not, as is now apparent, for the reasons suggested by Hume. The recent divergence
between the two laws is less a reflection of national character, on this interpretation,
than a question of the respective roles of judge and jury. Reframing the issue in this
way then puts resistance by the Scottish legal profession and judiciary to the extension
of the 1957 Act to Scotland into a new light. It was argued at the time that this
change would be both unwarrantable and unnecessary because the position in
Scotland was that the question of verbal provocation could already be left to the
jury—a claim that Gordon suggests was and is unfounded.36 While the claim is, on
the face of it, a rather puzzling one, given the weight of evidence to the contrary, it
makes a little more sense when considered in the more specific context of what
impact the change would have on criminal procedure, for it would entail that control
over the meaning of provocation would pass from the judge to the jury. This should
also be read together with the general resistance led by Lord Cooper in his evidence
to the Royal Commission to the possibility of any legislative change being made to
the existing criminal law, for this suggests a general defensiveness and resistance to
change on the part of the Scottish judiciary.37 The general position, then, once again
suggests an apparent absence of underlying principle, as the judiciary cling onto
their control over the distribution of questions of fact and law and their power to
prevent such questions going to the jury.38 This places a greater importance on the
claim that Scots law is more directly in touch with the values of the community, a
point to which we shall have to return in the following discussion.
33 Horder, Provocation, chs 7 and 8. Cf A Ashworth, Principles ofCriminal Law 2nd edn (1995), 225-
229. See, for example, the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in the cases ofAhluwaliah [ 1992]
4 All ER 889 and fl v Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987. For a recent decision which makes this distinction
very clearly and questions the approach taken by the Court of Appeal to the matter of the personal
characteristics of the accused, see Lord Goff in Luc Thiet Thuan [1996] 2 All ER 1033.
34 See the cases discussed in The Laws ofScotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (henceforth SME),
vol 7, para 273.
35 This is without even discussing the question ofcumulative provocation and domestic violence where
Scots law has shown little willingness to consider the depth of the problem. See T H Jones and
M G A Christie, Criminal Law 2nd edn (1996), 219-220, for the most recent summary of the position.
36 HC/HL Deb, 28 Jan 1957, col 784. See Gordon, Criminal Law, para 25-26.
37 On Lord Cooper's evidence to the Royal Commission see Farmer, Criminal Law, 160-166.
38 This also raises a question about the role of the reasonable man. Since the question of justifiability is
dealt with through the idea of correspondence, the broader question of justifiability in the
circumstances—necessary in England because of the extended grounds of provocation—does not
arise under Scots law. See Gordon, Criminal Law, paras 25-32 to 25-37.
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(3) Murder/manslaughter
This same pattern is evident ifwe turn from provocation to the development of the
law ofhomicide more generally. In both jurisdictions the early distinction was made
between murder and accidental killings, the former being defined in terms ofwhether
there was "malice aforethought" ("forethocht felony").39 Later, other defences and
mitigating circumstances, such as self-defence and provocation, where the
presumption of malice derived from the killing could be negated, began to be
recognised. The category of culpable homicide/manslaughter, defined in terms of
the degree of intent or recklessness, gradually emerged as the central category of
criminal homicide. By the middle of this century there was a common movement
towards the recognition that malice or intent was to be inferred from the
circumstances, rather than being a presumption of law.40 In both jurisdictions,
however, the law was still hedged around by a large number of residual technical
rules, and these have undermined claims to coherency or principle throughout the
modern period. Thus, murder was divided into the categories of voluntary and
involuntary murder. The latter was a form of constructive malice or intention, similar
to the old felony-murder rule, where death occurring in the course of certain serious
crimes was automatically treated as murder. In England prior to the 1957 Act
constructive malice was recognised in two situations: where death occurred while
resisting lawful arrest by an officer of justice; and where death occurred in the
course of, or furtherance of, a felony of violence.41 Scottish judges were reluctant to
admit the existence of constructive malice in Scotland to the Royal Commission
but, as Gordon dryly comments, the evidence is rather to the contrary.42 While in
England following the abolition ofconstructive malice in the 1957 Act s 1(1) (followed
by the Criminal Justice Act 1967 s 8), the movement has been towards a test of
liability based on the actual foresight of the accused, Scots law has struggled to rid
itselfof the constructive doctrine, something that has only now been achieved through
39 On possible borrowings see W D H Sellar, "Forethocht felony, malice aforethought and the
classification of homicide" in W M Gordon and T D Fergus (eds), Legal History in the Making(1991), 43-59.
40 In England moving towards a test of subjective malice, i.e. actual foresight of the circumstances,
prior to the decision in DPP v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 161. See also J W C Turner, "The mental
element in crimes at common law", in L Radzinowicz and J W C Turner (eds), The Modern Approach
to Criminal Law (1945) 195-261.
41 See Kenny, Outlines, 152-162. See also the 16th edn of this text by J W C Turner (1952) at 122, for
a more concise formulation of the "modern" felony-murder rule. (Cf "these 'constructive' doctrines
always lead to trouble": Denning LJ in Hosegood v Hosegood [1950] TLR 735).
42 Gordon, Criminal Law, 746. See e.g. Miller and Denovan, unreported, 1960 (discussed in Gordon,
Criminal Law, at 23-26). See also Macdonald, Practical Treatise, 90 ("Murder may be by personal
violence, or by poisoning, or by causing death while committing some other serious crime"), or at 91("Where death results from the perpetration of any serious or dangerous crime, murder may have
been committed, although the specific intent to kill be absent").
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adapting the meaning of Macdonald's definition of "wicked recklessness" to a
requirement of a display of actual recklessness on the part of the accused.43
The category of culpable homicide/manslaughter is likewise structured by the
survival of certain technical rules. In both jurisdictions it has been divided between
unlawful act manslaughter, which operates on the basis of a form of constructive
intention, and involuntary manslaughter where death occurs in the course of the
performance of an otherwise lawful act. These distinctions have survived in spite of
having been subjected to criticism, and neither system has dealt adequately with
the types of problem that are thrown up by their survival—although recently there
have been marked differences in approach.44 In England the courts have struggled
with little success to reconcile the constructive rules with a general approach that
requires actual foresight of the harm. Most recently this has led to the intriguing
resurrection of the category of manslaughter by gross negligence by the House of
Lords—though it appears that legislation will be necessary to lay to rest the doctrine
of constructive manslaughter.45 In Scotland, by contrast, there have been no recent
cases on negligent culpable homicide,46 and it seems that the courts are content to
operate with an extended category of recklessness that allows them to pass judgment
on the basis of the general criminality of the conduct rather than the actual or
implied foresight of the accused.47
While it is certainly arguable that in general terms this again mirrors a pattern
where the English judiciary have shown willing to restrict the scope of questions of
law in order to leave a greater scope to the jury, in contrast to the jealous preservation
of this power on the part of the Scottish courts,48 this is not a conclusion that I want
to labour in this context. On the one hand, this is because the effect would be to
inflate the practical importance of these conceptual distinctions: in both jurisdictions
the distinction between murder and culpable homicide/manslaughter is blurred and
remains so because it is something that tends to be determined by the decision of
the prosecutor to charge for one crime or the other, rather than by any of the
43 For a classic statement of the "subjective" position see G Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part(1953). For Scots law, where the meaning of the term "recklessness" has remained rather vague, see
the discussion in Gordon, Criminal Law, paras 23-14 to 23—31.
44 Compare the English "drugs" cases ofR v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260 and R v Dolby [1982] 1 All ER
916 with the Scottish case of Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 1994) 1995 SCCR 177 and
commentary by D Sheldon, "Dole, directness and foresight" 1996 Juridical Review (JR) 25^1.
45 R v Prentice [1993] 4 All ER 935; Adomako [1994] 2 All ER 79, overruling Stone ir Dobinson [1977]
2 All ER 341. See also Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No
237, 1996).
46 Though see the unreported case ofRoss Fontana (1990) cited in Jones and Christie, Criminal Law,
at 218.
47 See e.g. Lourie ir Fry 1988 SCCR 634. For discussion see Farmer, Criminal Law, 167-172.
48 It might, for example, be interesting to reinterpret the plea of Lord Goff for the adoption by the
English courts of the Scottish concept of "wicked recklessness" in this way. See his "The mental
element in the crime of murder" (1988) 104 LQR 30-59.
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theoretical distinctions that are of such importance to academic lawyers.49 On the
other hand, it is because the state of the law of homicide has had more interesting
consequences for the development of general theories of liability in the two
jurisdictions and this, in turn, has consequences for our larger argument. The English
law of homicide post-1957 can be read in terms of a movement to draw stricter
distinctions between the categories ofhomicide on the basis of concepts of intention
and foresight of risk. In George Fletcher's terms, there is a general movement towards
"act-oriented" liability (which also shifts the fact-law distinction) by adopting a general
theory of excessive risk-taking,50 a movement that would in a certain sense be
completed with the enactment of the current Law Commission proposals on the
reform of the law of manslaughter.51 This, to be sure, has been a halting process,
driven in large part by the demands of a newly professionalised academic legal culture
and encountering only partial acceptance on the part of the judiciary.52 Notwith-
standing, it is a movement that has also structured the development ofgeneral theories
of criminal liability in England as the law of homicide has become a model for
criminal law as a whole. In the same period Scots law has largely operated with an
"objective" test of liability, which occasionally veers towards the outrightly moralistic,
as Scots law remains rooted in the idea of the judgement of conduct rather than of
the mental element.53 No clear single pattern of liability—no principled basis to the
law—has emerged within the law of homicide, let alone, as we shall see in the next
section, in the criminal law as a whole.
(4) The declaratory power of the High Court
It is a broad characteristic of Common Law systems in general, rather than the
Scottish system in particular, to claim an inherent jurisdiction to criminalise new
crimes or old crimes committed in a novel manner. It could be argued, in fact, that
this is the least remarkable aspect of either system. There is almost a necessary
claim to a residual jurisdiction in a Common Law court—although this can
undoubtedly be fostered by the sort of open-ended criminal procedure that both
systems have enjoyed. While not always expressed in an explicit form, the behaviour
of the courts in both jurisdictions evidences a clear belief in the existence of such a
49 It is interesting to note, for example, that in Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025, the leading English case
on intention, Lord Bridge heavily criticised the prosecution for having charged murder rather than
manslaughter.
50 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, 259-274.
51 See above, n 45.
52 For three accounts of this process from very different perspectives see Dennis, "Critical condition",
219-221, 223-228; J Horder, "Two histories and four hidden principles of mens rea" (1997) 113
LQR 95-119; and N Lacey, "A clear concept of intention: elusive or illusory?" (1993) 56 Modern
Law Review (MLR) 621-642.
53 The former being expressed most recently in the Lord Advocate's Reference (No I of 1994) 1995
SCCR 177.
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power. The position of the English courts today is surely not far removed from that
of the Scottish courts, where it is only the explicit, rather than implicit, use of the
power that is regarded as a problem. Indeed, the most surprising feature of English
law is that the question of judicial law-making was problematised relatively late;54 a
broad overview of the jurisprudence of the English courts this century shows an
uncanny resemblance to that of the Scottish courts in the same period.55 On this
view, it is beyond question that Scottish jurists writing at the beginning of the
nineteenth and again in the mid-twentieth century sought to codify the existence of
the power in a certain form as a means of marking out the difference between the
two systems.
As a result of this, however, the question of the declaratory power must be treated
as more than just a historical curiosity, because it has been placed at the heart of an
argument about the principled basis of the Scottish system. The existence ofprinciple
in Scots law, it is argued, means that there is a natural constraint on the operation of
the power and, going further, founds a more fundamental claim about the distinctive
nature of Scots law and the proper role of judges and jurists in its development.
Even at this level, however, it is not easy to sustain the argument that the development
of Scots criminal law has been either distinctive or principled. The English criminal
law may have had different institutional roots in the courts of assizes and common
pleas, but the process of development of the modern law is broadly comparable to
that of Scotland. In both jurisdictions the pre-modern law developed according to
the constraints and possibilities afforded by the procedures and practices of the
central courts. However, by the early nineteenth century the substantive law was in
the process of being separated from these peculiar procedural origins and being
expressed in the form of independent rules that were capable of a more general
application.56 There remained, of course, differences in the mode ofexpression, but
the key point is that this process was largely the result of the work of jurists seeking
to systematise and order the law—whether this was done in the form of manuals of
practice or in the form of an academic commentary. A feature of Scots criminal law
in this period is actually that there was very little discussion of the principles of the
54 In the case of Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220. This was due, amongst other things, to the different
attitude in England towards the development of the law through legislation in the nineteenth century.
See generally M Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and Policy in England 1830-
1914 (1990).
55 See the discussions in A T H Smith, "Judicial law-making in the criminal law" (1984) 100 LQR 46-
76; R M Jackson, "Common law misdemeanours" (1936-38) 6 Cambridge Law Journal 193-201;
Ashworth, Principles, chs 2 and 3; C K Allen, "The nature of crime", in Legal Duties (1931), 221-
252.
56 On Scotland see J W Cairns, "Hamesucken and the major premiss in the libel 1672-1770: criminal
law in the age ofenlightenment", in R F Hunter (ed), Justice and Crime (1993) 138-179. In general
see M Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (1991); D Lieberman, The
Province ofLegislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1989).
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penal law. The ready acceptance of Hume's Commentaries, which itself makes little
or no attempt to expound the principles on which the law is supposedly based, has
meant that there has been little discussion ofwhat the principles of the criminal law
might be.57 This is certainly the case, as I have argued elsewhere, in relation to
Hume's discussion of the declaratory power. This is expressed neither in terms of
rule or principle, but merely viewed as an unremarkable facet of common law
procedure. It is not clear whether we should be more troubled by Hume's omission,
here and elsewhere, to discuss principle or by the continued inability of modern
writers to come to terms with this omission.58
In other respects it remains exceedingly unclear what is being talked about when
criminal lawyers or judges refer to the principled basis of criminal law. There are at
least three broad versions of this claim, and these may co-exist in a particular system
without necessarily being consistent with each other. The first, which is the most
commonly made version of the claim today, is that there are certain general principles
of criminal liability, relating to the capacities and qualities of the individual actor,
that are capable ofstanding apart from the particular substantive crimes (the general
part).59 These, in combination with the principle of legality, essentially codify the
criminal law as a relation between state power and a rational, autonomous individual—
though this is done in terms of a structure of liability that is derived from the modern
law of homicide. However, these principles are relative newcomers to the field, at
least in the manner in which contemporary theorists use them as a prescriptive guide
to the nature and scope of the law: prior to the 1950s neither Scots nor English law
had an extended treatment of any general principles of liability in this sense. Ifwe
compare, for example, the treatment in two of the leading textbooks of the period—
the fifth edition of Macdonald's Criminal Law (1948) and the fifteenth edition of
Kenny's Outlines ofCriminal Law (1936)60—we find a short treatment of the idea of
criminal capacity (capacity, insanity, minority, complicity) followed by a reasonably
detailed exposition of the substantive law, and with the latter part of each book being
57 In England by comparison there was a vast literature on the principles and purposes of the criminal
law. See for different approaches W Eden, Principles ofPenal Law (1771); J Bentham, Introduction
to the Principles and Morals of Legislation (1789); E H East, A Treatise on Pleas of the Crown(1803). For a reasonably full bibliography see L Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law
and its Administration from 1750: vol I: The Movementfor Reform (1948).
58 See e.g. SME, vol 7, paras 5-15 for the suggestions that Hume laid down a rule (Christie) or that he
invented the existence of the power (Gane). These types of argument are discussed in Farmer,
Criminal Law, ch 2. This has been exacerbated by the recent tendency of the court to treat statements
in Hume as if they were principles of law.
59 A good recent example of the first is Ashworth, Principles. In Scots law see Gordon, Criminal Law,
Part I. See in general N Lacey, "Contingency, coherence and conceptualism: reflections on the
encounter between 'critique' and 'the philosophy of the criminal law'", in R A Duff, Philosophy and
Criminal Law (1998), 9-59.
60 The 16th edn (1952) was the first under the editorship of J W C Turner, who revised the structure
of the book in order to introduce the theory of subjectivism more fully, and presaged the later
transformation of English law.
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devoted to criminal procedure. It is clear that, to the extent that either of the books
seek to elucidate the principles of the law, they were reluctant to do so in terms of
any single pattern of liability that was to be imposed across the law as a whole.61
The second sense in which the claim to principle is made takes the form of the
argument that the criminal law should protect certain social interests or values,
such as person, property, the state and so on. Crime, in this sense, is defined as the
breach of these civil rights, and the function of the criminal law, as the necessary
adjunct of the civil law, is to sanction breaches in those civil rights as a means of
protecting the aggregate interests of those individuals who make up the larger
community.62 The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is recognised as
being of importance to the law, although not in the strong sense appealed to in the
first claim, of founding a general principle of foresight or intention. It instead takes
the form of a minimum recognition of voluntariness or mental element in the
definition of each crime. The principle appealed to is thus a formal claim about the
coherency of function of the legal system as a whole and the organisation or exposition
of the law, rather than being a particular claim about the nature of criminal liability
or even the internal consistency of the field.63 It is thus recognised that each area of
law has developed independently and according to different principles. This, certainly,
would seem to be closer to the model of exposition adopted in the texts referred to
above, though as we have already noted there was, for example, no single clear
concept ofproperty. To the extent that this is largely a principle ofexposition, however,
it is not ofmuch guidance in the resolution ofparticular disputes, and it is extremely
unlikely that judges are referring to principle in this sense of the term when discussing
the declaratory power.
This brings us to the third type of claim, for the form in which this claim is
normally made is that the practice or experience of the law in the government of
social life is both guided and constrained by certain principles or values. Thus, it is
argued that the law reflects certain principles or values in its practice and that to
enforce the law in this sense cannot be seen to breach the principle of legality since
the display of flexibility is merely a means ofenacting and responding to community
values and understandings of the functions of the criminal law. This type of claim is
perhaps closest to the conventional accounts of Scots law—and it is a claim that is
characteristic ofCommon Law systems.64 Without rehearsing the arguments against
61 On different patterns of liability in the law see Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, Part I.
62 A classic version of this claim is to be found in J F Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (1877).
63 This, for example, is the sense in which Bentham elaborates the idea of principle in the criminal
law. See OfLaws in General (1970 reprint), chs XVI-XVIII.
64 See e.g. S Styles, "Something to declare: a defence of the declaratory power of the High Court", in
Hunter, Justice and Crime, 211-231, and the arguments reviewed in I D Willock, "The declaratory
power: still indefensible", 1996 JR 97-108. See also A Cadoppi, "Nulla poena sine lege and Scots
criminal law: a continental perspective" 1998 JR 73-88.
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this position in any detail, it is enough to state two related reservations. The first is
that the principled basis of the law in this sense is at best a claim about the role of
the courts in the development of the law, and that it does not entail any consequences
for the substance of the law itself. Certainly it is abundantly clear that there are no
substantive principles that can be extrapolated from the actual use of the declaratory
power—though it might be thought desirable that the law were developed within
some sort of conceptual or theoretical limits (or that this is desirable given the
absence of even procedural constraints). This, at best, would suggest the need for
greater clarity about what precisely is being done by the courts when they claim to
act in a "principled" manner on behalf of the community. More cynically, we might
suggest that there is a deliberate elision of these different senses of principle in
order to blur the boundaries of the law. The second reservation is that it is simply no
longer clear, as prosecution and enforcement have been professionalised and as the
experience of the courts is increasingly distanced from the practices and agencies
that govern social life, that the courts are in a position to speak directly on behalf of
the community.65 In other words, the social and institutional basis for this third
appeal to principle has been displaced by the growth of modern institutions ofcriminal
justice. This necessarily has certain consequences, not only for the way in which
academic lawyers must think about the law, but also for the law's own capacity to
reflect social values in its procedures and practices.
o o o
The purpose of this brief survey has been to elaborate the claim that both systems
have historically shared certain common characteristics, and to hint at the nature of
the distinctions that seem to divide the contemporary systems. The general conclusion
that we would be permitted to draw at this point is that the differences between the
two laws have never been either as fundamental or as absolute as they have been
understood to be, and that this belief leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of
the relation between the criminal law of the two jurisdictions. Historically it is clear
that the territory between the two laws has been a much more debatable land,
without any clear historical points ofdemarcation in substance. It is from within and
traversing this common area that symbolic borders have been constructed, marking
out the shared ground as peripheral, and distancing what has lain in common.
C. DRAWING BORDERS
We have now seen some of the points through which the border has been drawn,
and it is clear that, in symbolic terms at least, the effect has been that of establishing
65 W T Murphy, "As if: camera juridica", in C Douzinas, P Goodrich and Y Hachamovitch (eds),
Politics, Post-Modernity and Critical Legal Studies: The Legality ofContingency (1994), 69-106.
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a substantial distance between the laws. However, if the argument so far has
been concerned with the tracing out of what lies in common between the two
systems, it is now necessary to shift the focus, to look at the reasons for the divergence
between the two laws in the period since 1957. In addressing this question we find
that two broad explanations present themselves. The first argues in terms of the
relative degree of progress or development of the two systems to suggest that Scots
law is more backward, that it is a slow or late developer in legal terms. This is
to argue that the renaissance in Anglo-American penal theory that began in the
1950s,66 and which was the prelude to an extraordinary wave of legal reform, simply
by-passed Scotland. The developments that have characterised English law in this
period—the reform and modernisation of the law through codification and the
explosion of interest in criminal legal theory—are largely absent from Scots law,
and as a result it has been left behind. The second makes a more familiar claim
about the fundamental characteristics of the two systems. This is the argument
that the distinctive nature and genius of Scots law is an expression of the separate
identity of the Scottish nation. The possibility of some convergence between
the systems in the period we have discussed may even be allowed, but is attri-
buted to overbearing English legal ideas and institutions squeezing the vitality
out of the native Scottish ones. The more recent divergence is then explained
in terms of the rediscovery or renaissance of Scottish legal thought coinciding,
fortuitously or otherwise, with the rebirth of political and cultural nationalism in
Scotland.67
Whatever the respective merits of these explanations, it is certainly clear that
there has been both a qualitative and a quantitative transformation in the discussion
of criminal law in England over the last forty years, and that this cannot be explained
wholly in terms of the influence of certain books—no matter how stimulating—not
least because these same books have been available to Scots lawyers and academics
for the same length of time. The obvious starting point for comparison might then
be to turn to look at the legal and academic culture, the environment in which this
literature is produced.
Beginning with even the most rudimentary comparison of appellate decisions in
criminal cases in the two cultures, we immediately encounter striking differences:
Scottish decisions are on the whole much shorter than their English equivalents;
there are a far greater number of decisions in which one judge gives the judgment
66 The main works here would be H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968); G Williams,
Criminal Law: The General Part (1953); and J Hall, Principles ofCriminal Law 2nd edn (1960).
67 On this generally see Lord Cooper, The Scottish Legal Tradition (1949) and Smith, British Justice.
These are discussed in I D Willock, "The Scottish legal heritage revisited" in J P Grant (ed),
Independence and Devolution: The Legal Implications for Scotland (1976), 1-14, and in Farmer,
Criminal Law, ch 2.
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of the court; and dissenting judgments are practically non-existent. While these are
not necessarily conclusive of any argument, they are certainly strong indicators of
the existence of a certain malaise: of the absence of arguments in court which
challenge accepted judicial understandings, and of a judicial attitude that seeks only
to preserve the status quo. The impression that there seems to be little interest or
concern in the development of the substantive criminal law is confirmed ifwe look
more closely. To take only a few of the more egregious examples we find that the
judiciary have regularly displayed a lack of understanding of the existing law and of
the implications of their decisions. Thus, in the case of Cawthorne v HM Advocate,
Lord Guthrie may unwittingly have introduced a new ground for the mens rea of
murder into the law of Scotland;68 in the case of Meek (r Others v HM Advocate, a
contentious English decision on the law of error in rape was said to be one which
"readily accords with the law of Scotland";69 and in a series of decisions on the crime
of "causing real injury" to another, the High Court has rendered meaningless the
concept of causation in crimes against the person.70 Although the Scottish judiciary
is certainly not unique in these failings—for English commentators can regularly be
heard to complain about the inability of members of the judiciary to grasp even the
most basic points of the law71—these suggest the existence of a judicial culture
where discussion of, or reflecbon on, the principles of the law or criminal liability is
discouraged.
It is tempting to attribute this entirely to the personalibes and influence ofcertain
individual judges—and it is clear that this is an important factor. Thus, in Scotland
one would single out the particular influence at different times of, say, Lords Cooper
and Emslie. The influence of these judges extended beyond any actual decisions to
their organisation of the court, and the fostering of a particular judicial style. This is
to be seen, for example, in their respective contributions to the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment in 1950 and the House of Lords Select Committee on Murder
and Life Imprisonment in 1989.72 These are important not only as unique (though
non-authoritative) judicial statements of the basis of criminal liability in Scots law,
but also because they reveal a certain tone of resistance to theory, where legal
68 1968 JC 32.
69 1982 SCCR 613.
70 See Khaliq v HM Advocate 1983 SCCR 483; Ulhaq v HM Advocate 1990 SCCR 593; Lord Advocate's
Reference (No 1 of 1994) 1995 SCCR 177.
71 The most notorious example is G Williams, "The Lords and impossible attempts" (1986) 45 CLJ 33-
83, correcting Lord Bridge in Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560. Generally see N Lacey, "The territory
of the criminal law" (1985) 5 OxfordJournal ofLegal Studies 453^62; Dennis, "Critical condition",
215-218.
72 Evidence presented to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (18th day, 4 April 1950);
Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment (HL Paper 78
I-III (1989)), discussed in Farmer, Criminal Law, ch 5.
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argument is eschewed in favour of expediency.73 This may be compared with England
where, in spite ofacademic complaints, there have been some notable contributions
made to the development of the criminal law by judges in the superior courts.74 The
important point here is not so much that the English judiciary has been consistent
in the following of a particular theory of liability—for it has not—but that there
have been members of the judiciary who have at least shown some grasp of criminal
jurisprudence and displayed a willingness to engage with the problems to which it
gives rise.
More important than this individual influence, however, are the rules of criminal
procedure and the operations of the criminal justice system, for together these provide
the setting in which judicial decision-making takes place—indeed, it may even be a
consequence of Scottish procedure that it allows certain individual judges to exercise
a disproportionate influence. English commentators have already pointed to the
effects of the reform of the Court of Appeal and appeals procedure in the 1960s in
giving the court greater weight and fostering a higher level of judicial discussion of
questions of substantive law.75 In Scotland, however, the increase in the workload of
the High Court, in both its trial and appellate jurisdiction, over the last thirty years
due to the greater availability of criminal legal aid does not seem to have had any
comparable impact on the quality of decisions. It is probable that this is in part a
consequence of earlier reforms of criminal procedure, and in particular that rule
introduced by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 which did away with the
requirement that the prosecutor specify words of intent in every indictment.'6 This
freed the courts from the need to examine the specific wording of each indictment,
allowing a more general consideration of the guilt of the accused. One unremarked
consequence of this has been that that recent strand of criminal law theory which
has been led by linguistic philosophy to consider the precise meaning of certain
words of intent, and which has dominated judicial and academic culture in England,
has been denied the opportunity to take hold in the Scottish courts. In addition,
prosecutorial discretion in Scotland has meant that indictments are framed as
alternatives, or that crimes are charged at the lesser level in order either to produce
73 A striking example of the depth of this resistance, and of a possible change in judicial culture, is to
be seen in the recent case ofBaxter v HM Advocate 1997 SCCR 437 at 439, where the Lord Justice-
General rebuked counsel in the following terms: "Somewhat surprisingly we were told that neither
side had found any authority on what could be regarded as incitement. There is in fact quite a body
of authority on what constitutes incitement in the context ofart and part guilt of a completed crime,
as a glance at paragraphs 5-22 and 5-23 of Gordon's Criminal Law shows."
74 E.g. Lords Devlin, Diplock and Mustill, and more recently Lords Bridge (excepting his aberration
on criminal attempts) and Goff and Lord ChiefJustice Taylor. While not everyone would agree with
the positive effects of these interventions of all these judges, their influence is unquestionable.
75 See Dennis, "Critical condition", 233-236; R Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994 (1996),
chs 1 & 2.
76 Sections 5-8, 58, 59. See now Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, Sch 3.
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guilty pleas or to leave questions of liability to the judge at the sentencing stage. It is
also worth stressing that the extent of judicial law-making in the Scottish courts is
something that is directly connected to the willingness of the Crown Office to stretch
the limits of the law in the prosecution of certain conduct.77
One response might be to remark that the High Court and Crown Office are
merely compensating for some of the notorious shortcomings of the Scottish Law
Commission in the area of criminal law reform, and the poor quality of Scottish
legislation on crime and criminal procedure.78 On this view, an active judiciary has
become the necessary carrier of legal reform in Scots criminal law. However, leaving
aside the reservations already expressed about the principles that operate here and
the continuing capacity of the courts to carry out this function, it is instructive to
compare this with the situation in England. There much of the post-1957 development
has been statutory, driven in particular by the establishment of the Law Commission
and the initiation of the current codification project in 1967, as well as the creation
of the Criminal Law Revision Committee by the Home Office in 1959.79 These
initiatives gave a small group of academic lawyers a stake in the process of law
reform, providing them with a platform from which to promote a particular theory
of liability which married theoretical concerns with questions of substantive law. In
England this also coincided with the expansion of the universities in the 1960s. This
changed the nature of legal scholarship as a new breed of professional academic
lawyers weakened the tradition of the professional teaching of the law. Whether or
not one agrees with the particular vision of criminal law that has been pursued by
the codifiers—and whether or not there is any prospect of the code actually being
legislated—it is unquestionable that these developments have raised the level of
interest in and standard of debate on questions of criminal law in both academic
and judicial contexts.
In Scotland, by contrast, an active resistance to the possibility of legislation coupled
with judicial law-making based on unarticulated principles has led to the creation of
a very different sort of academic culture.80 It is clear that legal writing, particularly
in the area of criminal law, has long been dominated by the concerns ofpractitioners,
77 As indicated above at 43^44, certain of these remarks would also apply to England, except perhaps
that the system being bigger is less easy to control.
78 This is the subject of a valuable recent paper: C H W Gane, "Criminal law reform in Scotland"(1998) 3 Scottish Law it Practice Quarterly 101-116, although he probably underestimates the
extent to which the courts have created this role for themselves. See also T H Jones, "Criminal
justice and devolution", 1997 JR 201-218 at 202-205.
79 See Law Commission Annual Report (1968). See also Codification ofCriminal Law. A Report to the
Law Commission (Law Com No 143, 1985) and A Criminal Code for England and Wales vol 1:
Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989).
80 It will be interesting to see whether the unoffical draft Scottish Criminal Code currently under
preparation will have the effect of stimulating debate on this subject in Scotland.
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with the result that there has been little sustained analysis of Scots criminal law.
There have been limited opportunities or outlets for academic writing on the subject.
The few journals devoted to Scots law do not provide the space to develop theoretical
arguments, and legal publishers have shown a marked preference for texts which
are capable ofbridging the markets of students and practitioners. Recent publishing
initiatives in the area of criminal law have taken one of two forms. On the one hand
we have seen the republication of the supposed classics of the genre81—though in
the case of Macdonald's Practical Treatise or Alison's Principles ofCriminal Law it
might have been better had they been allowed to pass quietly into obscurity, since
these serve only to remind us of how threadbare the Scottish tradition really is. On
the other hand, the "Law in Practice" series and the publication of rival student
texts on criminal law, while welcome, are perhaps better indicators of the economics
of publishing and the financial imperatives of the Research Assessment Exercise
than of the belated flowering of an academic culture.82 It is clear that the one
outstanding attempt to provide a systematic and contemporary theoretical account
of the law, Sheriff Gordon's Criminal Law,83 is valued by lawyers for its apparent
comprehensiveness rather than for the sophisticated argument it develops concerning
the nature of liability. The limited extent of its impact on the judiciary is apparent
from the increasingly despairing tone of Gordon's commentaries in the Scottish
Criminal Case Reports. It is indeed arguable that until very recently there has been
little academic legal culture to speak of in Scotland.84
We are now in a position to return to and reassess the broad explanations for
divergence that were offered at the beginning of this section. The problem with the
first view—that Scots law is backward—is of course that it relies on its own "Whig
history", a belief in a certain type of progress. Lying at the heart of this is the
assumption that only a general subjective theory of liability can provide the foundation
for criminal law, and that this can only be introduced into the law by means of the
enactment of a criminal code. This is given a historical foundation through the
interpretation of the modern law in terms of the irresistible rise of subjectivism—a
view that is read back into the past to claim a longer "enlightened" lineage for this
theory than is in fact the case.85 This, moreover, generalises from the particular
81 Hume's Commentaries was republished in 1986, Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law ofScotland(1832) and Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1833) in 1989, and Macdonald's Practical
Treatise in 1986.
82 Though occasionally authors have shown a willingness to stretch the constraints of the format. See
esp M Christie, Breach of the Peace (1990). The rival student texts are Jones and Christie, Criminal
Law and A McCall Smith and D Sheldon, Scots Criminal Law (1994).
83 1st edn, 1967; 2nd edn, 1978.
84 K G C Reid, "The rise of the academic lawyer in Scotland" in H L MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into
the 21st Century (1996), 39-49.
85 For conflicting versions of challenges to this view see Lacey, "Contingency", and Horder, "Two
histories".
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conditions that have obtained in England to a claim about modernity and progress
in criminal law in general. These supposedly natural and universal assumptions have
been challenged by critical legal theory86—and they can equally be challenged by a
comparative point of view. These developments are far from inevitable and, as we
shall see, may be undesirable or inappropriate in the context of Scottish ideas and
institutions. The second type of explanation, however, in spite of its superficial
attractions, is also deeply problematic. This is in part for reasons that we have already
considered: that there is little evidence of the fundamental divergence that is claimed,
nor of the supposedly principled basis of the system. It is also because this tradition
is deeply unworldly, creating certain myths about a simple world that it saw was
passing and of the "destiny" of Scots law. It is also highly conservative, since a closer
analysis reveals a fear of the development of the modern state and a nostalgic longing
for the past.87 The Scottish legal tradition, then, has not in fact been about the
simple preservation ofScottish identity, but its invention and the consequent rejection
of the possibility of certain types of reform. It has been ofunquestionable importance
to the revival of a self confidence amongst Scots lawyers, but its own increasing
marginalisation is itself evidence of the passing of the view of Scots law and its
relation to Scottish identity that it sought to promote. In conclusion, then, both
explanations have exaggerated difference because of the need to press a particular
project; just as importantly, both have neglected the actual differences in practice
that would support a clearer view of the two jurisdictions.
D. CONCLUSION: DEBATABLE LAND
Whatever the shortcomings of these two explanations, it is clear that they offer two
different bases for the law, the two main types of discourse that are available in
which to theorise the contemporary criminal law. One is based on codification and
the extension of a certain form of subjective liability, the other on claims or myths
about the Scottish character and community. These two positions present themselves
as the alternatives in the dilemma that faces Scots law: to assimilate or to separate?
Is it better to join the mainstream ofAnglo-American thought or to pursue a course
of isolation? Yet we have also seen that this is a false dichotomy, for neither position
presents an adequate explanation of the position of Scots law. On the one hand, it is
arguable that the institutional conditions to support the former do not exist in
Scotland—and the prospect of playing catch-up with English law is not necessarily
86 See notably A W Nome, Crime Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law(1993), and now P Rush, S McVeigh and A Young, Criminal Legal Doctrine (1997).
87 For a discussion of the historiographies ofScottish and Anglo-British identities see C Kidd, Subverting
Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Histories and the Creation ofan Anglo-British Identity I689-C.1830(1993).
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an attractive one, even though to a great extent this is the path that is being followed
in recent writing. More importantly, this approach is presently being seriously
questioned in England, and it would be ironic in the extreme if Scots law were to
seek to move towards such a theory at the moment at which it was being abandoned
in the rest of the Anglophone world. On the other hand, the second position poses a
different set of problems as a principled basis for the law, since the principles that
are claimed to exist have been shown to be largely illusory and it seems in the end to
fall back on questionable assertions about law and community in Scotland.
However, the different institutional conditions in Scotland do support the idea
of the existence of a distinctive legal culture, a point that is of increasing importance
as we move closer to the establishment of the new Scottish Parliament. This poses a
challenge in terms of developing a principled basis for the law within the existing
legal culture. In order to do this I think that there is a need to reflect on the nature
of the Scottish law, without pursuing some of the more essentialist arguments
associated with the Scottish legal tradition. The challenge, then, is to attempt to
formulate the principled basis of the system, principles which might properly guide
us in our understanding of the law.88 In the formulation of such principles it is
necessary to follow two methodological guidelines (as I have attempted to do in this
article): that there should be a close attention to history; and that attention should
be paid to the relations between practice, procedure and substantive law.89 The
principles that are developed on this basis should thus not be alien or unrelated to
the context in which they have been developed, but just as importantly this requires
some redefinition of the idea of doctrine so that it is not conceived of as being
purely abstract or theoretical. This, it should be clear, amounts to the rejection of
the idea of a general and abstract theory of liability as this has been developed in
much contemporary Anglo-American criminal law theory. On this basis, and drawing
from the analysis presented in this article, I would suggest that the law could begin
to be understood in terms of the following types of principles: that constructive
rules should be rejected, because there is clear evidence that they are used in a
haphazard and ad hoc manner; that there should be closed definitions of crimes and
open definitions of defences; that there should be principles ofhow to review or use
English or other authority so as to develop the sort of comparative understanding of
the law that is necessary in a small jurisdiction; that the limits on creativity and
flexibility in the law should have to include, for example, limits on the exercise of
88 Cf the principles set out in Jones and Christie, Criminal Law, 358—361 (prospectivity, certainty,
effectiveness and fairness) or in Gane, "Criminal law reform", 114—116. Compare also the recent
interest in the principles of penal legislation in English law: A Ashworth, "Towards a theory of
criminal legislation" (1989) 1 Criminal Law Forum 41-63.
89 This argument is developed in Farmer, Criminal Law, ch 1. The argument of this article, however,
is developed according to similar methodological precepts.
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prosecutorial discretion and criminal procedure. Above all, the criminal law should
be judged less in terms of its supposedly distinctive character, essentially a negative
definition concerned only with origins, and more in terms of the justice and
accountability of the system as a whole.
This article has tried to return the debatable land of the criminal law to the
centre of argument about the identity of Scots law and so we should conclude by
returning to the debatable land with which we began. The debatable land was a land
of myth. Where the two countries met was also understood by its inhabitants to be
the land where the worlds of the natural and the supernatural collided. The path to
faerie led from under the Eildon hills, and the border ballads tell tales of demon
lovers and witches, the Queen of Elfland and the return of the dead. The inexplicable
is explained, loss and love lamented in songs of magic and regret. It is thus an
appropriate metaphor for the encounter between the separate worlds of Scottish
and English criminal law, for this too is a place where we have encountered myths
of the spirit of the law and lamentation for the loss of innocence which is the inevitable
consequence of the encounter between the two worlds. Love and death, then, have
been the preoccupations of the Scottish tradition. However, while in the ballads the
normal consequence of this loss is a greater self-understanding and knowledge of
the world, in the case of Scots law there has rather been an increase in delusion and
the retreat into myth. The land is debatable in the sense that it is contested territory.
We should not want to end this debate and retreat into isolation.
